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RELIGION AND RECUSAL
RICHARD B. SAPHIRE*
The question of the proper relationship between religion and the
judicial process has important theoretical and practical dimensions.
Recent scholarship has explored the question from the perspective of
political morality, asking whether and when, in the context of
democratic political theory, it is appropriate for public officials to rely
upon their personal religious convictions when they consider, debate,
formulate, adopt, and apply public policy. Scholars have adopted a
wide range of positions on this question, but most agree that the
question is particularly important as it pertains to the exercise of the
judicial function, and it is generally believed that making and justifying
decisions on the basis of religions beliefs is most problematic when
engaged in by judges.
There are many reasons for this view. Judges, of course, wield
political power, and from a theoretical point of view, they should be
subject to whatever restraints are thought necessary for official power
to be exercised in accordance with widely held principles of
(democratic) political legitimacy. But judges exercise a special kind of
power. Generally speaking, the judicial function is not one of law
making, but of law application. It is the judge's task to determine what
the law is and to apply it in the cases before him or her. The norms of
fairness and justice embedded in our political and constitutional
tradition require that the judge apply the law with optimum
impartiality. It is generally assumed that these norms require the judge
to put aside, to the extent humanly possible, values that are personal to
him or her, including values that are drawn from the set of religious

* Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. This paper was prepared for
delivery on April 4, 1997 at the Marquette University Law School's Conference on Religion
and The JudicialProcess: Legal, Ethica4 and Empirical Dimensions. It was prepared as a
response to an earlier version of John Garvey's and Amy Coney's paper, entitled Catholic
Judges in CapitalCases. As I suspect will be apparent, there is much in the published version
of the Garvey and Coney paper with which I agree. I wish to express my appreciation to Fr.
James Heft, S.M., Chancellor and University Professor of Faith and Culture at the University
of Dayton, Michael Perry, and Jan Konya for helpful discussions concerning the relevant
issues, and to Ms. Konya for valuable research assistance.
1. See JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 216 (1993).
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beliefs which that judge holds.2
Thus, when Federal District Judge John Sprizzo recently dismissed
contempt proceedings against two Catholic clerics who had been
accused of violating the court's orders restricting their protests at an
abortion clinic, some critics wondered whether his leniency was
attributable to his personal agreement with the religious values which
animated the protesters' conduct.3 Similarly, when Washington
Supreme Court Justice Richard B. Sanders went from his swearing-in
ceremony to an anti-abortion March for Life rally held on the state
capitol steps, he was charged with violating professional norms
governing the integrity, impartiality and independence of the judiciary.
Some suggested that his conduct, when viewed in light of its self-avowed
religious motivation, casted doubt on his ability to "rule fairly in a case
concerning abortion. 4 Finally, and perhaps somewhat more famously,
Supreme Court Justice Scalia's recent religiously-informed remarks at a
law school prayer breakfast raised, at least in some quarters, concerns
about his ability to objectively and impartially decide (at least) churchstate issues. 5
How should we think about this sort of conduct on the part of
religious judges? And what, if anything, should we do about it? These
questions are fraught with ethical, legal, and practical problems. From
an ethical perspective, we should ask whether it is wrong for judges to
rely upon their religious beliefs when they engage in the duties of their
office or when they speak publicly in ways which might reasonably be
understood to reflect on the performance of their official
responsibilities. From a legal perspective, we should ask whether a
judge's self-conscious resort to his or her religious convictions violates
constraints on judicial behavior imposed by constitutional, professional,
2. See generally, KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASON
(1995).
3. United States v. Lynch, 952 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). For discussion of Judge
Sprizzo's ruling, see David E. Rovella, Abortion Clinic Act Gutted by Unexpected Ruling,
NAT'L L. J., Feb. 3, 1997, at A6; A Ruling Too Far,NAT'L L. J., Feb. 3, 1997, at A18. For a
critical and sympathetic analysis, see Michael W. McConnell, Breaking the Law, Bending the
Law, FIRST THINGS, June/July 1997, at 13.
4. Carey Goldberg, Judge's Speech at Abortion Rally Sets Off Dispute on Free Speech
and Impartiality,N. Y. TIMES, March 22, 1997, at A8 (reporting views of legal scholars on
Judge Sanders's remarks. Goldberg also reported that "Justice Sanders said openly during
his election campaign that he was a Roman Catholic and opposed abortion."). Id. See also
Victoria Slind-Flor, Vocal Pro-LifeJudge, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 23, 1996, at A4.
5. See Robert A. Sirico, Scalia's Dissenting Opinion, WALL ST. J., April 19, 1996, at
A12. For a general and sympathetic analysis of Scalia's remarks, see Michael Stokes Paulsen
& Steffen N. Johnson, Scalia'sSermonette, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 863 (1997).

1998]

RELIGION AND RECUSAL

or statutory rules. Practically, we might ask whether we can develop
and administer legal restraints on the religious behavior of judges in a
way that responds sensibly to what is fair and reasonable to expect of
them as people.
John Garvey and Amy Coney, in their essay Catholic Judges in
Capital Cases,6 explore some of these questions by examining the
problem of recusal of religious judges called upon to officiate in capital
murder prosecutions. In particular, they are concerned about when
judges with scruples about capital punishment should recuse
themselves. They posit a devoutly Catholic judge who is called upon to
preside in a capital case brought under the so-called federal "drug
kingpin" statute.' The statute provides for capital punishment upon
conviction and places the judge in somewhat different positions
depending upon whether the guilt and sentencing phases of the
proceeding are tried to a jury or to the court. Garvey and Coney review
the official position of the Catholic Church on the issue of capital
punishment and conclude that the teaching of the Church establishes a
presumptive rule against the death penalty, and that the presumption is
not likely to be overcome given the realities that characterize the
6. John H. Garvey & Amy V. Coney, Catholic Judges in Capital Cases, 81 MARQ. L.
REv. 303 (1998).
7. Garvey and Coney focus on the dilemma that they suppose an "orthodox" Catholic
judge faces in capital cases. Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 305 and n.8. For reasons I will
not belabor here, I take their use of the term "orthodox" to denote an idea quite similar, if
not identical, to the notion of a "devout" religious believer, and so I will generally
characterize our paradigmatic judge as "devout."
The decision to use a devout judge as a model has some obvious attractions. It is not
uncommon to treat "devoutly" held religious beliefs (and believers) as inherently more
homogeneous and unyielding than more "liberal" forms of religious believing. But cf. Daniel
0. Conkle, Different Religions, Different Politics: Evaluating the Role Of Competing
Religious Traditions in American Politics and Law, 10 J. OF LAW & RELIG. 1, 14 (1994)
(noting considerable diversity among "fundamentalist" religious beliefs). It is hard for me to
know whether this is a valid way of thinking about "devout" Catholic thinking, although my
experience suggests some basis for doubt. Within my own Jewish religious tradition, the
notion that all "devout" or even "Orthodox" Jews think alike on such issues as capital
punishment is quite controversial and subject to serious question, cf. Menorah v. Illinois High
School Ass'n, 527 F. Supp. 632, 635 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (Jewish judge denied recusal motion in
case challenging a rule applied to forbid observant Jewish athletes from wearing yarmulke;
judge criticized the "myopia" of the movant's effort to "lump all Jews as fungible").
Although I recognize that Judaism is theologically and morally less centralized and
hierarchical than Catholicism. It might well be the case that a Catholic who is not devout (or
"orthodox" or "observant") in the sense contemplated by Garvey and Coney might have
even graver and religiously motivated qualms about the death penalty than the "devout"
believer, a point which highlights my concern about approaching the recusal issue from too
general a perspective.
8. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1994).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:351

contemporary American criminal justice system.
The judge is faced with the question of whether, as a matter of the
federal law governing recusal, he or she should be foreclosed from
sitting in capital cases. The federal law which governs recusal contains
more than one standard. First, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) requires a judge to
recuse himself or herself "in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned."9 This provision has been construed as
embodying an objective standard which asks whether a reasonable
person, informed about the facts and the parties of a case and of a
potential or alleged appearance of impropriety, would question the
Second, 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) requires
judge's impartiality.'0
disqualification where the judge "has a personal bias or prejudice
," This provision has been construed to require
concerning a party ....
a showing of bias in fact, not simply the appearance of bias. 2 As
Garvey and Coney note, precisely what Section 455(b)(1)'s "bias or
prejudice" standard entails has been the subject of some dispute. The
standard most certainly entails some notion of personal animosity, but it
probably includes more-for example, as Garvey and Coney put it, a
feeling or attitude of the judge which spoils a party's "hope for
success."' 3 Recently, Justice Scalia described the notion of "bias or
prejudice" as connoting "a favorable or unfavorable disposition or
opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate,either because it is
undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought
,,14 It
not to possess.. .or because it is excessive in degree ....
encompasses the idea that the judge is partial toward one of the parties
for reasons that are generally regarded to be inappropriate." Garvey
9. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994).
10. See, e.g., United States v. EI-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 961-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 720-21 (D. Idaho 1981). This standard is similar to the
one incorporated into Canon 3C1 of the American Bar Association's CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT (1983) which requires judicial disqualification "in a proceeding in which [the
judge's] impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
11. The disqualification standard contained in 28 U.S.C. § 144 has generally been
construed, at least with respect to its substantive requirements, as "virtually identical" to 28
U.S.C. § 455. See, e.g., United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1989). For
general discussion, see RICHARD FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND
DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 742-43 (1996) (discussing similarities and differences
between the two provisions).
12. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. at 959.
13. Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 333.
14. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,550 (1994).
15. But not all "partiality" is subject to condemnation (and recusal) under the statutory
standard. See id. at 552-534 ("'Partiality' does not refer to all favoritism, but only to such as
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and Coney suggest, drawing from Supreme Court cases dealing with the
issue of "death qualified" juries, that recusal is required where the
judge's ability to determine the facts or apply the law is, in some
fundamental way, skewed or distorted by the judge's moral or
conscientious scruples. A judge with unalterable moral objections to
the death penalty may be subject to disqualification if the judge's moral
scruples or conscience require him or her to violate or disregard his or
her duty to follow and apply the law. According to Garvey and Coney,
the devout Catholic judge is in precisely this position because her
religious scruples render her "unable to give the government the
judgment it is entitled to under the law."' 6 Presumably, the problem
would be the same if the judge's religious, or any other scruples, require
her to sentence the convicted murderer to death in every case,
regardless of facts and law which at least justify a different outcome.
Garvey's and Coney's thoughtful analysis raises a number of
interesting and important questions, only some of which I can address
here. It is certainly possible that a judge could be presented with the
moral and professional dilemma which they describe. But how would
the question of the judge's (dis)qualification be raised? When a party
files a motion to recuse or to disqualify, the judge must consider
whether his or her participation in the case will in fact be affected by
"bias or prejudice" or whether it would be reasonable for the parties to
question the judge's impartiality. Assume that Judge Smith is a devout
Catholic who recently has been appointed to the bench and who has
never before been assigned to a capital case. If Judge Smith had never
publicly proclaimed his unalterable, religiously-premised opposition to
capital punishment, how would the parties suspect that his religious
beliefs would make him impartial in the way Garvey and Coney
describe? As they note, it is clear that the mere fact that Judge Smith is
Catholic, or that he belongs to a Catholic parish, would not suffice to
provide the parties (in this case the government) a basis to obtain, and
perhaps even to seek, recusal."7 After all, it is not the judge's status as a
is, for some reason, wrongful or inappropriate.").
16. Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 334.
17. El-Gabrowny, 844 F. Supp. 955, 962 ("[W]hether the presiding judge is an Orthodox
Jew or a Zionist or some combination of the two, or neither, is utterly irrelevant to this
case.") Cf. In re Disqualificationof Fuerst,674 N.E.2d 361 (1996) (fact that Catholic judge
presiding over a case in which Catholic Diocese of Cleveland and Catholic priest were parties
was, standing alone, insufficient to warrant disqualification under either actual bias or
appearance of impropriety standards). Relatedly, Canon 4C of the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUcr generally removes as a basis for disqualification a judge's service in several official
capacities, and presumably membership, in religious organizations.
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Catholic per se which is claimed to be disqualifying, but the fact that
Catholic religious doctrine is (presumptively) opposed to capital
punishment and that Judge Smith personally subscribes to that doctrine.
One could imagine a religious group organized around opposition to
capital punishment and whose (rigorously applied) membership
standards required each member to personally endorse that principle
and to act consistently with it in all aspects of their lives. The Catholic
Church, to my knowledge, is not such an organization.
Assume, however, that Judge Smith's Catholicism is public
knowledge,' and that the prosecuting attorney suspects that the judge is
devout and personally subscribes to the anti-death penalty theology that
Garvey and Coney describe. 9 When the recusal motion is filed (or
when the judge considers his qualification to sit sua sponte'), what
should we expect of him? Presumably, the inquiry should not be
confined to a determination of Church doctrine. Even if Garvey and
Coney are correct about Catholic morality, the question of Judge
Smith's actual bias should not depend on the nature of Church doctrine
simpliciter, but on Judge Smith's attitude toward or concerning that
doctrine. The judge's attitude may well raise a number of difficult
questions. Among these questions are (1) the precise content of the
relevant Catholic doctrine; (2) the Church's view about the
authoritativeness of that doctrine in and for the lives of its members,
which includes the way and the extent to which the doctrine is binding
and the consequences the Church attaches to non-adherence; (3) the
judge's attitude about the doctrine as well as his attitude about the
institutional and personal costs of non-adherence; 2' and (4) the extent to
18. Perhaps it was raised and discussed during the judge's confirmation process. See
generally Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion:
CatholicsBecoming Justices,39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047 (1990).
19. Would the prosecutor have an ethical obligation to raise his suspicions concerning
the judge's religiously-based bias? Would a defense attorney have such an obligation if there
was some suspicion that the bias ran in favor of capital punishment?
20. It has been observed that 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) can be raised sua sponte. Leslie W.
Abramson, Specifying Grounds for Judicial Disqualificationin Federal Courts, 72 NEB. L.
REV. 1046, 1081 (1993).
With respect to the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, it has been said that "Canon
3C is intended to be used by a judge at the start of each case as a checklist to assist in
deciding whether at that point he should disqualify himself from any participation in the
proceedings." LESLIE W. ABRAMSON, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3C OF
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 11 (1992). It has also been suggested that, even prior to
considering the ABA Code disqualification provisions, the judge "should first consult his
own emotions and conscience, and pass an 'internal test of freedom' from disabling
conflicts." Id.
21. Discerning the judge's attitude toward Church doctrine might be an extraordinarily
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which Church doctrine accepts a role differentiation between the judge
as Church-member-believer and the judge as public official (and
whether Judge Smith believes the Church's view on this issue is, for
him, authoritative).
Now, as I said, I think that these questions may be complex, ' and
their complexity bears importantly on the question of whether Judge
Smith should recuse himself. It may be the case that questions of
recusal that are based on religious beliefs are particularly, if not
uniquely, complicated. In many other circumstances where recusal is
required or warranted, the law attaches a presumption that certain
interests of the judge necessarily preclude him or her from deciding a
case with the requisite degree of open-mindedness (for example, where
the judge has some economic interest in the outcome of the case or
where the judge or members of his or her family are related to the
litigants). There is no such presumption attached to a judge's religious
beliefs and there almost certainly, as a matter of both constitutional
principle and political morality, should not be one. In part, this is
probably because there is less agreement in our political culture on how
religious beliefs, as opposed, for example, to beliefs about money or
familial relationships, are held by people and the importance that those
beliefs have in terms of how people act and think. What if every devout
Catholic judge believed that a theological gun were pointed at her head
and was set to go off and excommunicate her (and, perhaps, dispatch
her to eternal damnation) if she followed the law and decided a case in
a way which conflicted with Church doctrine? I suspect that most
people would agree with Garvey and Coney that no devout Catholic
judge should sit in a case under these circumstances.'
difficult task. The party seeking recusal, and the judge himself, might be put in the rather
delicate position of determining not only the objective content of the doctrine, but the degree
to which the judge is committed to it. As Judge Noonan recently noted in the course of
explaining his decision not to recuse himself from a case involving protests at a clinic where
abortions were performed, any distinction between "firmly held" and "lukewarmly
maintained" religious beliefs is likely to be, and for Noonan was, quite unworkable. Feminist
Women's Health Center v. Codispoti, 69 F.3d 399 (9th Cir. 1995).
22. Garvey and Coney acknowledge that "the authoritative force of Catholic teaching
on church members [is a] fairly complex" subject. Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 314.
For reasons I shall note, I think I find the subject even more complex than they do.
23. One might infer from Garvey's and Coney's analysis that they believe this is the
position that most devout Catholic judges are in (or ought to view themselves as in) with
respect to the death penalty. I should note that they do recognize that "even among
Catholics of this [orthodox] description there may be some differences of opinion" about
what the Church doctrine requires. Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 344. And there may
well be evidence that would support such a belief. One example may be the position that

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 81:351

It is hard for me to assess the extent to which this situation fairly
describes the position of the "average" devout Catholic judge called on
to preside over prosecutions under the federal "drug kingpin" or similar
statutes. However, I suspect that it does not describe the position of
many such judges. As a threshold issue, I believe it is the case, as
apparently do Garvey and Coney,' that the Church's anti-capital
punishment doctrine is not infallible. As noninfallible teaching, its
authoritative or binding status is not absolute in the sense that one
could still be considered a "good Catholic" (i.e., at a minimum, not
subject to excommunication) if one acted in contradiction to the
Church's teachings.2 Moreover, I suspect that many people in Judge
Smith's position have a much more complicated and nuanced view of
the proper relationship of their religious convictions to their official
responsibilities.'
some American Catholic Church leaders took in response to Catholic public officials who
expressed their sense of obligation to enforce laws protecting a woman's abortion rights. See
Ari L. Goldman, O'Connor Warns Politicians Risk Excommunication Over Abortion, N. Y.
TIMES, June 15, 1990, at Al (discussed in John Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 849, 851 (1993)). Based on discussions I have had with Catholic colleagues
and friends, however, my sense is that the Church's official position on the obligation of
public officials to follow noninfallible Church teachings is a quite complicated issue as to
which there is considerable debate and disagreement. Of course, even if the Church does not
require it of her, any Catholic judge who accepts the Church's teaching as authoritative and
binding upon her personal and official conduct and who feels obliged to ignore the law and
enforce the Church's political morality probably ought to recuse herself, either under the
recusal statutes or principles drawn from judicial ethics and due process.
24. Garvey and Coney seem to agree that Catholic teaching on capital punishment is
not infallible. They note that infallible teachings must be formally identified as such and that
"the Pope's encyclical does not display the kind of clear intention that accompanies infallible
pronouncements." Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 315. Indeed, while passages from Pope
John Paul II's treatment of the issue in EVANGELIUM VITAE certainly suggest the
seriousness and importance of the teaching, see, e.g., EVANGELIUM VITAE § 57 (May 3,
1983), they do not seem to bear the characteristics required for infallibility. Nonetheless,
Garvey and Coney argue that this teaching is "entitled to serious respect from church
members." Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 316. It is hard to tell whether they believe that
the Church's teaching on capital punishment should be regarded as if it were infallible.
25. It is my understanding that the noninfallible teachings of the Church are, as a matter
of Church doctrine and tradition, to be taken seriously and respectfully and are entitled to
considerable, and perhaps even presumptive, deference. But individual Catholics are
morally entitled to dissent from non-infallible teachings, although there appears to be a lack
of consensus on how this can be done responsibly. On the complexities of attributing moral
or legal status to noninfallible Church teachings, see JOHN GALLAGHER, THE BASIS FOR
CHRISTIAN ETHICS (1985);
NONINFALLIBLE TEACHINGS,

JAMES

HEFT, THE RESPONSE CATHOLICS OWE TO
THE TORCH OF GOOD NEWS 105 (Bernard Prusak,

in RAISING

ed. 1986).
26. Garvey and Coney note that some devout Catholic judges will have real difficulty
sorting out their duties to Church and secular law where the two conflict. Garvey & Coney,
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Indeed, I suspect that many judges would reach a conclusion similar
to that reached by Federal District Judge Marion Callister who was
asked to recuse himself in a case challenging the validity of Idaho's
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. The motion for recusal
was premised on the fact that Judge Callister was not only a member,
but also a "Regional Representative" of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints (Mormon), whose leadership had publicly announced
its opposition to the ERA.' In rejecting the recusal motion, Judge
Callister emphasized the nation's tradition of viewing religion and
He also
government as operating in "separate spheres. '' 2s
acknowledged that as a member of the Church, he had "undertaken the
obligation to live the Christian doctrines as they are taught by the
church, to assist the church in teaching these doctrines[,] and to help
provide for the temporal and spiritual needs of those belonging to the
church," 29 He further noted that "religious societies have never
claimed, nor have they been given, the right to interfere with the
relationship between governments and their citizens."30 Judge Callister
had not publicly expressed any position, nor had he engaged in any
supra note 6, at 346-47.
What should a judge do if she has not fully worked out the nature of her religious beliefs
and their relationship to the performance of her official function, but is uneasy about
whether and the extent to which her strongly held religious convictions might effect her
ability to follow the law? At one time, the recusal statutes were understood to incorporate a
"duty to sit" on an assigned case, which was understood to militate against recusal where no
valid legal reason for recusal could be established. See, e.g., Edwards v. United States, 334
F.2d 360 (5th Cir. 1964). When 42 U.S.C. § 455(a) was enacted, it apparently was intended to
do away with this rule, with the effect of advising judges to disqualify themselves in "close"
cases, Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706, 722 (D. Idaho 1981), although some courts
continue to apply a "limited version" of it. Flamm, supra note 11, at 615-18. In my view, if
the judge harbors substantial doubt, and perhaps where the judge concludes that the parties
might reasonably believe that she harbors such doubt, the judge ought to recuse herself. This
raises the question of whether a judge has a moral or ethical duty to advise the parties of her
doubt. While it may be the case that mere uneasiness or squeamishness on the judge's part
should normally not justify or require recusal, see, e.g., McGough v. McGough, 252 So. 2d
646 (Ala. Ct. App. 1970) (cited in Flamm, supra note 11, at 618), a judge should at least have
reasonable confidence in her ability to follow the law.
27. Judge Callister denied the plaintiffs' original motion to recuse, brought pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33 (D. Idaho 1979). He later denied a
second motion to recuse, in which the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that "[t]he Church
considers its position on the ERA to be of the utmost importance and those who back the
ERA are subject to sanctions, including excommunication, as is evidenced by proceedings
taken against the leader of the group 'Mormons for ERA."' Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp.
706,729-30 (D. Idaho 1981).
28. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. at 36.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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demonstrations or political activity, concerning the ERA, and he noted
that Mormon leaders had always taught that the principles and ideals
which the Church endorsed and taught "can only be implemented when
a majority of the people wish to implement them.",3' Finally, Judge
Callister observed that "the church has never taught either that it has
any place influencing judges in the interpretation of the laws, or that a
judge's religious beliefs take precedence over his sworn duty to uphold
the Constitution and laws of the United States," and that "as a judge, I
have no obligation to the church to interpret the law in any manner
other than that which
3 2 is required under the Constitution and the oath
which I have taken.

Judge Callister's observations represent responses to several of the
questions I identified earlier as bearing importantly on the issue of
recusal. If we take his observations at face value,33 they would seem

clearly to justify his position against recusal. If our hypothetical Judge
Smith were to reach similar conclusions in deciding whether to recuse
himself from participation in a capital case, a similar result would be
warranted.' This is not to say that every devout Catholic judge would
or should necessarily reach the same conclusion.3 ' The question of
31. Id at 37.
32. 507 F. Supp. at 710-11.
33. Some of Judge Callister's observations were based upon facts that presumably
would have been subject to verification. The principles and teachings of the Mormon Church
might also be scrutinized, although such an inquiry could prove to be problematic on a
number of grounds. The judge did not offer any comments on whether and to what extent
he, as a Mormon or otherwise, agreed or disagreed with the ERA. Presumably he had
concluded that his personal beliefs would not interfere with his ability to impartially
adjudicate the case.
The Freeman case was the subject of considerable controversy, both inside and outside
the government. A number of United States Senators wrote to the Department of Justice
asking that it abandon the recusal attempt, and the government did not appeal Judge
Callister's recusal decision. See, Freeman, 507 F. Supp. at 711-12 n.2 (setting out Solicitor
General McCree's memorandum of decision explaining the basis for the government's
decision not to appeal).
See generally Senator Jake Garn & Lincoln Oliphant,
Disqualification of Federal Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a): Some Observations on and
Objections to an Attempt by the United States Department of Justice to Disqualify a Judge on
the Basis of His Religious and Church Position,4 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1981).
34. Whether similar conclusions would be warranted, of course, would be difficult to
determine. Questions that would need to be explored may include: whether the Catholic
Church maintains the same "separate spheres" distinction between church and state that
Judge Callister attributed to the Mormon Church (or whether the judge believes it does);
whether the Catholic Church teaches that a judge's religious beliefs must be subordinated to
the judge's official responsibility and, if not, whether the judge accepts the Church's position.
35. In their discussion of recusal under the "appearance of impartiality" standard
embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), Garvey and Coney recognize that even some "orthodox"
Catholic judges might disagree about whether, notwithstanding the Church's injunction
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recusal should not be made to turn solely on a judge's membership in a
faith community," nor on the official teachings of the Church or on the

attitude of any single judge toward those teachings. 7

Unless one

assumes that every devout Catholic judge necessarily believes that, and
will act as if, he or she is under the theological gun, any generalized

claims about the duty to recuse in capital cases should be received with
some skepticism.
By way of conclusion, I think it worth recalling an exchange that
took place between Senator Strom Thurmond and Stephen Breyer
during Breyer's confirmation hearings before the Senate Judiciary
Committee. Responding to Thurmond's question regarding his views
on the death penalty, Breyer stated:
Senator, if a judge has strong personal views on a matter as
strong as the death penalty, views that he believes might affect
his decision in such a case, he should perhaps, if they are very
against capital punishment, they are bound by a conception of role morality to impose the
death penalty. They also properly warn against the risks associated with making easy
"sociological claims about who is a Catholic, or what Catholics think and do." Garvey &
Coney, supra note 6, at 345-46. The apparent diversity of thought and belief within at least
the American Catholic Church might well suggest that even some "non-orthodox" Catholic
judges might have even greater scruples against participating in the enforcement of the death
penalty than their otherwise more orthodox colleagues.
36. As Judge Leon Higginbotham has so eloquently put it, "[i]t would be a tragic day
for the nation and the judiciary if a myopic vision of the judge's role should prevail, a vision
that required judges to refrain from participating in their churches, in their nonpolitical
community affairs, in their universities." Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of
Operating Engineers, 388 F. Supp. 155, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
37. Garvey and Coney acknowledge the importance of this point with respect to recusal
under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), but apparently not to recusal under Section 455(b)(1), where I
believe it is also relevant. (Imagine, for example, an appellate court deciding whether a
devoutly Catholic judge committed error in refusing to recuse himself in a motion filed
pursuant to Section 455(b)(1)).
In this regard, a determination of recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) could well be more
complicated than a determination under Section 455(b)(1). As noted earlier, the former
provision embodies an "appearance of impartiality" standard which is not dependent, as is
the latter provision, on a finding of actual bias. Garvey and Coney conclude that a Section
455(a) motion to recuse should, as a general matter, be denied if based exclusively on the
judge's membership in the Catholic Church. Garvey & Coney, supra note 6, at 344-46.
Because of what I take to be the complexity of Catholic doctrine and the diversity of thought
and belief among Catholics (as well as for the constitutional concerns they discuss), I am
inclined to agree with them. However, a more difficult problem would be presented if a
judge belonged to a religious community whose recognized, authoritative doctrine
unalterably opposed capital punishment, and whose official doctrine required profound
sanctions against even public officials who disregard that doctrine. In such a case, a judge
might well properly conclude that, regardless of whether he or she has accepted and
internalized the doctrine or is prepared to violate it, a reasonable person could believe that
he or she could not be impartial.
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strong.., you might take yourself out of the case.
38 I have no
such personal view in respect of the death penalty.,
Breyer elsewhere observed:
[T]he only time in which [subjective belief] enters is if you think
the law is one way and you think your own subjective belief is
the other way, and you feel that you cannot follow what you
believe the law to be because of your subjective belief, then
don't try, don't try. You can remove yourself from the case.... ."
One would, I think, certainly want to include (at least some, and
perhaps especially devout) religious views in the category of "strong
personal views." Whether they constitute "subjective beliefs," in the
ordinary sense in which Justice Breyer probably intended, is a question
that deserves a good deal of thought, as does the question of whether
they operate on those who hold them differently than do other sorts of
beliefs that are normally thought to implicate the issue of recusal. 4° And
whether religious beliefs pose, as a general matter, special problems for
theories of judging is itself an important issue that has been the subject
of some dispute, 4' as many of the other contributions to this symposium
attest.
Professor Garvey and Ms. Coney have done an impressive job of
focusing attention on the particular, and in some ways perhaps even
unique, dilemmas which face judges whose religious convictions might
interfere with their ability to determine the law and apply it "faithfully"
and impartially to the parties that come before them. They conclude
that the religious scruples that a devout Catholic judge will most

38. Excerpts from Senate Hearings on Supreme Court Nominee, N. Y. TIMES, July 13,
1994, at A16.
39. Federal News Service, July 13, 1994, Capitol Hill Hearing, Hearing of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing for Judge Stephen G. Breyer,
cited in Ori Leve, Personal Morality and Judicial Decision-Making in the Death Penalty
Context, 11 J. LAW & RELIG. 637, 640 (1994-95).
40. As I have suggested, where the authoritativeness and bindingness of a belief is
importantly dependent on the consequences that one's faith community attaches to nonadherence, the "subjectiveness" of the belief can be an especially complex, which is not
necessarily to say a unique, question. I note in passing that at least two treatises dealing with
the problem of recusal do not treat a judge's religious convictions as a matter worth either
distinct or extensive discussion. See Flamm, supra note 11; JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS (1995).
41. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 932 (1989) (criticizing the notion that theories of judging should treat a judge's
religious convictions differently from a judge's non-religiously based moral convictions);
Scott Idleman, Note, The Role of Religious Values in JudicialDecision Making, 68 IND. L.J.
433 (1993).
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probably possess should almost always4 2 foreclose participation in legal
proceedings which could result in a death sentence. Their analysis
provides good reasons to be persuaded that a judge who holds the
particular religious scruples they appear to hold should not sit in such
cases. The extent to which their more general arguments about religion
and recusal are as persuasive is, it seems to me, a bit more problematic.

42. The situations where Garvey and Coney believe that recusal is not indicated, at least in
capital prosecutions under the statutes they discuss, include where a judge is called upon to
preside over only the guilt-determination phase of the prosecution; where a judge collaterally
reviews at least some challenges to a capital sentence; and where an appellate judge is called
upon to review the conviction of guilt, but not the imposition of the death penalty. Garvey &
Coney, supranote 6, at 324-25,326-29,329-31.

